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1. Introduction 
We begin with a chronological enumeration of the concepts that will be formally defined and 
related in the present paper.  
The concept of value of a transferable utility game was introduced by Shapley in 1953. His 
initial idea was to answer the question of what a player may reasonably expect from playing a 
game. However, by requiring players' evaluations to be consistent in order to achieve 
efficiency (exact distribution of the social output) and symmetry (equal treatment of equals), 
the Shapley value is more of a normative tool.  
The concept of dividend was introduced by Harsanyi in 1959. The idea is to associate to each 
coalition a dividend (positive or negative) that is distributed among its members to define an 
allocation of the social surplus. Harsanyi shows that the Shapley value coincides with the 
payoff that results from the equal division of dividends within each coalition. The set of 
allocations that results from all possible distributions of the dividends is an object that has 
been studied independently by Vasil'ev in papers published in Russian in 1975 and 1978, and 
by Hammer, Peled and Sorensen in a paper published in a Belgian operations research journal 
in 1977. While the latter used the name "selectope", here we shall retain the term Harsanyi 
set. Derks, Haller and Peters popularized the concept in a paper published in International 
Journal of Game Theory in 2000. At that time, they did not know about the contributions of 
Vasil'ev. These became known with the publication in 2002 by Vasil'ev and van der Laan of a 
paper containing all the results known by that time. Since then, a number of papers has been 
published in particular by Derks, van der Laan and Vasil'ev (2006, 2010), adding new results, 
including an axiomatization of the Harsanyi set.
1
  
Weber has introduced in 1988 the notion of probabilistic values that allocates to each player 
his expected marginal contribution computed with respect to a probability distribution 
independent of the game's data. Quasi-values are then obtained by considering probability 
distributions ensuring efficiency, the Shapley value being the unique efficient and symmetric 
quasi-value.  
In 1971, Shapley has characterized geometrically the core of a convex game using the concept 
of marginal contribution vector that associates allocations to players' orderings: for a given  
ordering, each player receives his marginal contribution, following the ordering. The core of a 
convex game is then the nonempty and convex polytope whose vertices are precisely the 
marginal contribution vectors. Weber (1988) has later defined the concept of random order 
value as the expected marginal contribution vector, given a probability distribution over 
players' orderings. Weber shows that random order values are quasi-value, the Shapley value 
                                                 
1
 Billot and Thisse (2005) have proposed an axiomatization of what turns out to be a much larger set of 
allocations by not imposing a positivity axiom.  
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being the random order value corresponding to the uniform probability distribution. 
Moreover, Weber shows that the core is a subset of the set of random order values, 
equivalently defined as the convex hull of the marginal contribution vectors. This set is 
known as the Weber set and, following Shapley's characterization of the core, the two sets 
coincide on the class of convex games. 
In his 1953 paper, Shapley did consider the possibility for symmetric players to be treated 
differently. The asymmetric version of the value is obtained by introducing exogenous 
weights in order to cover asymmetries that are not included in the underlying game. The 
weighted Shapley value has been axiomatized later, in particular by Kalai and Samet (1987) 
without explicit reference to weights, by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) using a generalized 
potential function and by Dehez (2011) in a cost sharing context, along the lines suggested by 
Shapley (1981). The value associated to positive weights turns out to result from a weighted 
division of dividends within each coalition and, as a consequence, weighted values are 
Harsanyi payoffs. Monderer, Samet and Shapley (1992) have shown that the set of all 
weighted values – the Shapley set – contains the core. To quote the authors, this inclusion "is 
somewhat surprising in light of the difference in concept behind these solutions". Weighted 
values being random order values, the Shapley set is contained in the Weber set and the three 
solution sets coincide when applied to  convex games.  
The Harsanyi set turns out to be the largest solution set. It includes the Weber set and, Derks, 
Haller and Peters (2000) have shown that it coincides with the core for  positive games – 
games whose dividends are non-negative. Consequently, positive games being convex, the 
four solution sets – core, Shapley, Weber and Harsanyi sets – coincide when applied to 
positive games.  
Solutions are usually characterized axiomatically. They can also be characterized starting with 
the Harsanyi set and then imposing restrictions on dividend distributions. A natural restriction 
is monotonicity. It consists in requiring that the share of a player in a coalition does not 
increase if the coalition is enlarged. Even if such restrictions reduce considerably the set of 
possible dividend distributions, it is not sufficient to generate a particular solution set. Billot 
and Thisse (2005) claim that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors resulting from monotonic 
dividend distributions coincides with the core if the game is convex. We show that this is 
actually true only for three players! Assuming a monotonic dividend distribution, individual 
rationality obtains under in 3-player superadditive games and in 4-player convex games. 
Beyond four players, we show that there is no hope. Under a stronger monotonicity condition, 
Vasil'ev (1988) shows that Harsanyi payoffs vectors are random order values. If the 
distributions of dividends within coalitions are obtained from the distribution of dividends 
within the grand coalition by Bayesian updating, Derks et al. (2000) show that the resulting 
Harsanyi set coincides with the set of weighted Shapley values.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces transferable utility games. Solution 
concepts are then defined and interrelated in Section 3, with a particular attention to weighted 
Shapley values and the case where some players are assigned a zero weight. In Section 4, we 
review the axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley, Weber and Harsanyi sets. We then look 
at the characterization of the Weber and Shapley sets by way of restrictions on dividend 
distributions. We finally consider the subsets of Harsanyi payoffs that result from restrictions 
linked to the structure of the game. The last section offers a few concluding remarks and an 
appendix gathers intermediary results.  
2. Transferable utility games  
2.1  Characteristic functions 
Cooperative games cover situations in which a group of individuals cooperate on a common 
project with the objective of maximizing the resulting collective gain. It is assumed that utility 
is transferable through some commodity-money, allowing for transfers (side-payments) 
among players. A cooperative game with transferable utility is defined by a player set N and a 
characteristic function v that associates to each coalition S  N a real number ( )v S  that 
represents its (potential) worth, defined as the minimum gain that it can realize without the 
participation of the others. In particular, ( )v i  is what player i can obtain alone and ( )v N  is 
the maximum amount that the "grand coalition" is able to generate. By convention, ( ) 0.v     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two games ( , )N v  and ( , )N v  on a common player set are said to be strategically equivalent 
if there exists 0a   and nb  such that  
 ( ) ( ) ( )v S a v S b S     
Notation: For any given set T, we denote by  ( )T S T S    the collection of 
nonempty subsets of T and by  ( )i T S T i S    the collection of nonempty subsets of 
T containing i. Upper-case letters are always used to denote subsets and the corresponding 
lower-case letters are used to denote their sizes: | |, | |,...s S t T   Coalitions {i,j,k,…} are 
sometime written as ijk… Set inclusion is denoted    and strict inclusion by .  For a 
given subset S, \S i  denotes the subset obtained by subtracting i from S. In the same way, 
S i  denotes the subset obtained by adding i to S. It will be convenient to write  
 \( ) , ( | ) and ( , )i S i S N S
i S
x S x x x i S x x x

      
for any vector nx  and nonempty subset ,S N  with the convention ( ) 0.x    In 
particular, \ .
i
N ix x
   Vectors are compared following the sequence ,x y  x y  and 
.x y  In some instances, the summation sign   will be used, without reference to a set 
when there is no ambiguity. For a given finite set A, we denote by ( )A  the set of all 
probability distributions on A.  
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This defines an equivalence relation. In particular, a game ( , )N v  and its 0-normalization 
0( , )N v  defined by  
 
0 ( ) ( ) ( )
i S
v S v S v i

    
are strategically equivalent. A game can be restricted to a subset of its player set. Formally, 
given a game ( , )N v  and a subset ,T N  the restriction to T is the game ( , )TT v  defined by 
( ) ( ) for all .Tv S v S S T    
2.2  Superadditivity and monotonicity 
Throughout the paper, characteristic functions will be assumed to be superadditive i.e. for all 
S, T in N,    
 ( ) ( ) ( )S T v S v T v S T        
This is a natural assumption that is satisfied in most economic and social situations: getting 
together is beneficial, or at least harmless. Superadditivity implies in particular the inequality 
( ) ( ).v i v N  Interesting games are those for which a strict inequality holds. They are called 
essential. Obviously, a game that is strategically equivalent to a superadditive game is itself 
superadditive.  
A characteristic functions is monotone if ( ) ( ).S T v S v T    It implies that the larger 
surplus is generated by the grand coalition. There is no direct relation between superadditivity 
and monotonicity except for the following lemma.
2
  
Lemma 1 Consider a game ( , )N v  such that ( ) 0v i   for all .i N  Superadditivity then 
implies that the characteristic functions v is monotone and positively valued.    
As a consequence, the 0-normalization of a game is a monotone and positive-valued game.  
2.3  Harsanyi dividends  
We denote by ( )G N  the set of all set functions on the finite set N . It is a vector space that 
can be identified with 2 1.
n   Shapley (1953) shows that the collection of unanimity games 
( , )TN u  defined for all non-empty subsets T N  by  
 
( ) 1 if
0 otherwise
Tu S S T 

 
forms a basis of the vector space ( )G N  i.e. there exists a unique 2 1n   dimensional vector 
( , ) ( ( , ) | ( ))TN v N v T N    such that:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )T T T
T N T S
v S N v u S N v 
 
    (1) 
                                                 
2
 Proofs of lemmas are in Appendix.  
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with the convention 0.   Following Harsanyi (1959, 1963), the 'sT  are interpreted as the 
dividends that accrue to coalition T. Indeed, according to (1), distributing the dividends is 
feasible within every coalition.
3
  
The dividends can be defined recursively, starting with 0,   as follows: 
 ( ) for allT S
S T
v T T N     (2) 
i.e. 
 
{ }
{ }
{ }
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ...
i
ij
ijk
v i
v ij v i v j
v ijk v ij v ik v jk v i v j v k




  
      
 
 Alternatively, the collection of 'sT  is the unique solution of the linear system (1): 
 
( )
( , ) ( 1) ( ) ( , )t sT
S T
N v v S T N T 

      (3) 
Remark 1  The dividends associated to the unanimity game ( , )TN u  are given by: 
 
( , ) 1 if
0 otherwise
S TN u S T  

   
A player i is necessary for player j in a game ( , )N v  if the marginal contributions of j are 
equal to zero in all coalition not containing i: ( ) ( \ ) for all .v S v S j S i   In particular, 
( ) 0.v j   Using (2), van den Brink et al. (2014) prove the following Lemma. 
Lemma 2 If i is necessary for j in ( , ),N v  then ( , ) 0 for all \T N v T N i    such that .j T   
2.4  Positive games 
Dividends can be negative or positive. A game is (totally) positive if its dividends are all non-
negative. Actually, given an arbitrary game ( , ),N v  the dividends associated to its 0-
normalization 0( , )N v  are unchanged except for coalitions that are singletons: 
 
{ } 0
0
( , ) 0 for all 
( , ) ( , ) for all , 2
i
T T
N v i N
N v N v T N t

 
 
  
  
The term almost positive is used to qualify a game whose dividends of multi-player coalitions 
are non-negative. Equivalently, a game is almost positive if its 0-normalization is positive. 
Obviously, 2-player games are almost positive under superadditivity.  
Remark 2  Positive games are monotone. This can easily be seen from (1).  
                                                 
3
 To keep notation simple, the dependence of the T on the game will sometime be omited.  
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2.5  Marginal contributions 
The marginal contribution of player i to coalition S is defined by ( ) ( \ ).v S v S i  It is his value 
added to coalition S by player i and it is of course zero for all coalitions of which he is not a 
member. For coalition of which he is a member, superadditivity implies that they are bounded 
below by his individual worth: 
 ( ) ( \ ) ( ) for all such thatv S v S i v i S N i S      (4) 
Two players i and j are symmetric in a game ( , )N v  if they contribute equally to all coalitions 
to which they belong: ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ ) for all such that , .v S v S i v S v S j S N i j S      A player 
i is null in a game ( , )N v  if he never contributes: ( ) ( \ ) 0 for all .v S v S i S N     
Remark 3 A player is null if and only if all dividends associated to coalitions containing that 
player are all equal to zero. This is an immediate consequence of (2). See also Lemma 2.  
Let N  denote the set of all players' orderings. The marginal contributions vector ( , )N v
  
associated to the players' ordering 1( ,..., )n Ni i    is the vector defined by:  
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , ) ( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ( 2,..., )
k
i
i k k
N v v i v v i
N v v i i v i i k n



 
   
  
 (5) 
i.e. 
 ( , ) ( ) ( \ ) ( 1,..., )i ii N v v v i i n
      
where i  denotes the set of players preceding i in ,  i included. There are n! marginal 
contribution vectors, not necessarily all distinct. Looking at strategically equivalent games, if 
( ) ( ) ( )v S a v S b S   for some 0 and ,na b    
 ( , ) ( , )i i iN v a N v b
       (i = 1,…,n) (6) 
2.6  Convex games 
A game ( , )N v  is convex (or supermodular) if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v S v T v S T v S T      for all 
and .S T N  Obviously, convexity implies superadditivity and a game strategically 
equivalent to a convex game is itself convex. It is easily verified that unanimity games are 
convex. As a consequence, positive games are convex as positive linear combinations of 
convex games, and almost positive games are convex as well by strategic equivalence.  
Shapley (1971) shows that a game is convex if and only if players' marginal contributions do 
not decrease with coalition size:  
 ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ )i S T v S v S i v T v T i        
Hence convexity means increasing returns to size and marginal contributions are maximal at 
the grand coalition N. 
 9 
For any given player set N, the set of superadditive games, the set of monotonic games and 
the set of convex games are convex cones, denoted ( ), ( ) and ( )SG N MG N CG N  respectively. 
The set of positive games is a convex cone as well. It is denoted by ( ).G N  Following 
Remark 2, we have the following sequences of inclusions: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) and ( ) ( )G N CG N SG N G N MG N     
An arbitrary game ( , )N v  can be decomposed in a difference between two positive (and 
convex) games. Indeed, (1) can be written as 
 
( )
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) for allT T
T N
v S N v u S v S v S S N  

     (7) 
where 
 
: 0 : 0
( ) ( , ) ( ) and ( ) ( , ) ( )
T T
T T T T
T T
v S N v u S v S N v u S
 
  
 
      
The T coefficients associated to these two games are given by: 
 
 
 
( , ) 0, ( , )
( , ) 0, ( , )
T T
T T
N v Max N v
N v Min N v
 
 



 
   
Convex games form an interesting class of games because many solution concepts tend to 
agree when applied to convex games. Moreover, many interesting economic situations can be 
modeled as convex games, like production games with increasing returns, bankruptcy games 
(Aumann and Maschler, 1985) and airport games (Littlechild and Owen, 1973). Positive 
games also form a subset of convex and monotonic games with interesting properties and 
applications, like river games (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002), queuing games (Maniquet, 2003) 
and liability games (Dehez and Ferey, 2013).  
3. Values and solutions  
3.1  Basic requirements 
Given a game ( , ),N v  the problem is to allocate ( )v N  between the n players. A value is a 
mapping that associates a payoff vector ( , ) nN v   to a game ( , ).N v  A solution is a 
mapping   that associates a subset ( , )N v  of payoff vectors to a game ( , ).N v  The basic 
properties that a solution should ideally possess are the following:  
Nonemptiness: ( , )N v   
Efficiency: ( , ) ( ) ( )x N v x N v N    
Individual rationality: ( , ) ( ) for allix N v x v i i N     
Covariance: ( , ) ( , )x N v a x b N a v b       for all 0 and na b   
Convexity: ( , )N v  is a convex set 
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Nonemptiness implies restrictions on the class of games on which the solution applies. 
Efficiency is in the spirit of Pareto: allocating less than ( )v N  is not efficient and allocating 
more than ( )v N  is not feasible. Individually rationality is a minimal requirement to be 
imposed on allocations: no player will ever accept to take part in a collective project if his 
remuneration falls short of what he could secure by himself. A solution is covariant if, once it 
has been applied to a game, it can be extended to all strategically equivalent games. 
Convexity is a natural requirement in a world of transferable utility.  
Imputations are individually rational and efficient allocations. This defines the imputation set:  
 ( , ) { | ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) for all }nI N v x x N v N x i v i i N       
The class of games ( , )N v  satisfying the inequality ( ) ( )v i v N  is the largest class of 
games on which the imputation set is a well-defined solution. It includes superadditive games. 
If the game is essential, it is the regular simplex of dimension n–1. Otherwise, it reduces to 
the singleton ( (1),..., ( )).v v n  The imputation set is the largest set satisfying the above 
requirements.    
3.2  Stable allocations: the core 
The core is the set of imputations that no coalition can improve upon: 
  ( , ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) for allnC N v x x N v N x S v S S N      (8) 
It extends rationality from individuals to coalitions: given an allocation, a coalition that 
receives less than what it could secure is in a position to object. In this sense, core allocations 
are "stable".
4
  
The core is a convex subset of the imputation set and it may be empty. The largest class of 
games on which the core is a well-defined solution is the class of balanced games.
5
 
Superadditivity is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for a game to have a nonempty core. 
However, it is easily verified that a game ( , )N v  with a nonempty core satisfies the following 
weaker condition:  
 ( ) ( \ ) ( ) for allv S v N S v N S N     
Remark 4 In the case of a 3-player game ( , ),N v  balancedness is equivalent to the inequality 
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3) 2 (1,2,3).v v v v    It shows that intermediate size coalitions should not be too 
strong. Notice that almost positivity requires a strengthening of the inequality: {1,2,3} 0   if 
and only if (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (1,2,3).v v v v    This follows from  Lemma 1.  
                                                 
4
 The term "core" was introduced by Gillies (1953, 1959) in connection to the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable 
sets. It was later introduced as an independent solution concept by Shapley. The core has been axiomatized by 
Peleg (1986)  using the reduced game property. 
5
 See Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967).  For a complete account, see Kannai (1992).  
 11 
Remark 5 It can be easily verified that, if i and j are symmetric players, allocation obtained 
by exchanging andi jx x  in a core allocation x are also core allocations. Hence, if nonempty, 
the core contains allocations that give to players i and j equal amounts. Furthermore, the core 
allocates zero to null players.  
Shapley (1971) shows that convex games are balanced and that the core of a convex game is 
the convex polyhedron whose vertices are the marginal contribution vectors defined by (5). 
Ichiishi (1989) shows that this is actually a necessary and sufficient condition for convexity.  
3.3  Probabilistic and quasi-values 
The concept of value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as a measure of what a player may 
expect from playing a game. The Shapley value belongs to the family of probabilistic values 
introduced by Weber (1988). Let S
iq  be the probability that player i leaves coalition S, i.e.  
  0 for all , 0 if and 1S S Si i i
S N
q S N q i S q

       
These may be subjective probabilities or objective probabilities resulting from some random 
mechanism. They depend on the coalitions and not on the game. Following Weber (1988), the 
probabilistic value associated to the probability distributions ( , )Siq S N i N   defines for 
each player his expected marginal contribution: 
  
( )
( , ) ( ) ( \ ) ( 1,..., )Si i
S N
N v q v S v S i i n

    (9) 
A probabilistic value does not necessarily define an efficient payoff vector because 
probability distributions are unrelated. Quasi-values instead are efficient probabilistic value. 
They are obtained from probability distributions satisfying the following conditions:  
 
\
1 and for all ,N S S ii i i
i N i S i N S
q q q S N N
  
       (10) 
Weber (1988) indeed proves that the probabilistic values defined in (9) satisfy efficiency 
under (10).
6
 By requiring consistency of the probability distributions, quasi-values can be 
given a normative content.  
The Shapley value is a particular quasi-value. Weber (1988) proves that it is the unique 
symmetric quasi-value. It is defined by the following probabilities:   
 
( 1)!( )!
!
S
i
s n s
q
n
 
  
 
                                                 
6
 See also Derks (2005).  
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Hence, 
  
1
( , ) ( 1)!( )! ( ) ( \ )
!
i
S N
SV N v s n s v S v S i
n 
     (11) 
They only depend on coalitions' sizes and they correspond to the following fair random 
mechanism:
7
 first, a size between 1 and n is picked up at random and then each player 
receives his marginal contribution to a coalition picked up at random among the coalitions of 
the predetermined size, of which he is a member. All sizes have the same probability, namely 
1/n, and the probability of picking up a coalition of size s containing a given player is given 
by ( 1)!( )! / ( 1)!.s n s n    
The Shapley value is a well-defined single-valued solution on the class of all games, hence 
including superadditive games. Following (4), superadditivity ensures that the marginal 
contribution vectors are imputations. Covariance follows from (6). Hence, the Shapley value 
defines an imputation that is not necessarily stable, independently of the core being empty or 
not. However, as an average of marginal contribution vectors, it defines a core allocation 
when applied to a convex game. In view of the geometric characterization of the core of a 
convex game, the Shapley value occupies a central position. It generally differs from the 
barycenter of the core introduced as a solution concept by Gonzáles-Díaz and Sánchez-
Rodríguez (2007). It also differs from the simple average of core's vertices except for the 
particular case of convex games having distinct marginal contribution vectors.
8
  
3.4  Random order values: the Weber set 
The object obtained by considering all convex combinations of the marginal contribution 
vectors is called the Weber set. It is the convex hull of the marginal contribution vectors:
9
 
   ( , ) ( , ) for somen NW N v co x x N v      
Marginal contribution vectors being imputations, it is a well-defined solution on the class of 
superadditive games.  
An allocation in the Weber set may equivalently be regarded as the average marginal 
contribution computed with respect to some probability distribution on .N  For a given game 
( , ),N v  the random order value associated to the probability distribution ( )Np   is given 
by:  
 ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( 1,..., )
N
i iRV N v p p N v i n


 

   (12) 
                                                 
7
 A random allocation mechanism is "fair" if it treats ex ante all players equally.  
8
 This characterizes what Shapley (1971) calls strictly convex games, games with increasing marginal 
contributions.  
9
 The convex hull of a set A, denoted co(A), is the smallest convex set containing A.  See Rockafellar (1970).  
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Hence, the Weber set can alternatively be defined as the set of all random order values. A 
random order value is a quasi-value. Indeed,  ( , , ) ( ) ( \ )Si i
S N
RV N v p q v S v S i

   where the 
probability distribution ( )Siq  defined by 
 
:
( )
i
S
i
S
q p
 


     
satisfies (10). Actually, Weber (1988) proves that a solution is a quasi-value if and only if it is 
a random-order value. Hence, the Shapley value is also a particular random order value. It 
corresponds to random orders that are uniformly drawn i.e. ( ) 1/ !p n   for all :     
 
1
( , ) ( , ) ( 1,..., )
!
N
i iSV N v N v i n
n




    (13) 
The Shapley value is then the average marginal contribution vector and it can then be seen as 
resulting from another fair random mechanism: first, players are ordered randomly and they 
then receive their marginal contribution, depending on their position in the order that has been 
picked up.  
3.5  Dividend distributions: the Harsanyi set 
A distribution of the Harsanyi dividends can be summarized by a matrix   of dimension 
(2 1)nn   whose columns are the non-negative vectors ( , )T T N T    satisfying  
 1 and 0 for allT Ti i
i N
i T 

    
i.e. T  specifies how the dividend T  is distributed within coalition T. In particular, 
{ } 1ii   
for all i and N  can be any vector in the unit simplex .n  We denote by n  the set of all 
distribution matrices in the case of n players.  
For a given game ( , ),N v  the Harsanyi payoff vector ( , , )h N v   corresponding to a matrix 
n  is the value defined by the product ( , , ) ( , )h N v N v     i.e.  
 
( ) ( )\{ }
( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( 1,..., )T Ti i T i T
T N T N i
h N v N v v i N v i n    
 
          (14) 
It is an allocation. Indeed, we have:  
 
( ) ( )
( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )T Ti i T T i
i N i N T N T N i N
h N v N v N v v N    
    
         
The set of all distributions of H-dividends defines the Harsanyi set: 
10
 
  ( , ) ( , , ) for somen nH N v x x h N v       
                                                 
10
 The Harsanyi set was introduced as a solution concept by Vasile'v (1978, 1981) and by Hammers et al. (1977), 
independently. The later use the term selectope.   
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For a given subset T, 
T  is allocated between the members of T and, depending on its sign, 
they receive a positive or a negative amount. Hence, the Harsanyi set can alternatively be 
written as: 
 
( )
( , ) { | ( ) , ( \ ) 0, ( ) ( ) for all }n T i T
T N
H N v x x T x N T sign x sign i N 

       (15) 
It is obviously a nonempty and convex set. It is covariant. Indeed, if ( ) ( ) ( )v S a v S b S   for 
some 0a   and ,nb  we have: 
 
{ } { }
{ }
{ }
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( , ), ...
i i i i
ij
i j i j ij
N v v i a v i b a N v b
N v v ij v i v j
a v ij b b a v i b a v j b a N v
 


    
  
       
 
i.e. the additive term affects only the coefficient associated to singletons. Therefore, we have:  
 
( )
{ }
( )\{ }
( , , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
( , , ) ( 1,..., )
T
i i T
T N
T
i i i T
T N i
i i
h N v N v
a N v b a N v
a h N v b i n
  
  




  
  

      
In general, H-payoff vectors are not necessarily imputations and it may even be that the 
Harsanyi set contains no imputation at all.
11
 However, for almost positive games, H-payoff 
vectors are imputations. This is an immediate consequence of (14).  
3.6  Weighted values: the Shapley set   
The Shapley value relies on symmetry: equal amounts are allocated to "identical" players. 
Shapley (1953) derives (11) from the following formula  
 
( )
( , )
( , ) ( 1,..., )
i
T
i
T N
N v
SV N v i n
t


   (16) 
i.e. the Shapley value is the H-payoff vector associated to the uniform distribution of 
dividends within each coalition: 1/ for all and 0 for all .T Ti it i T i T       
Dropping symmetry opens the possibility for symmetric players to be treated differently. The 
asymmetric version of the value is obtained by introducing exogenous weights in order to 
cover asymmetries that are not included in the underlying game. It was introduced by Shapley 
(1953). Weighted games are denoted by ( , , )N v w  where ( , )N v  is a transferable utility game 
and 1( ,..., ) 0nw w w   are individual weights.   
                                                 
11
 Derks, van der Laan and Vasil'ev (2010) give the exemple of a game that fails to be superadditive, whose 
Harsanyi set has no intersection with the imputation set.  
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We denote by ( , , )SV N v w  the weighted Shapley value associated to the weighted game 
( , , ).N v w  It is the Harsanyi payoff vector associated to the distribution of dividends derived 
from the weights: 
 
( )
( , , ) ( , )
( )
i
i
i T
T N
w
SV N v w N v
w T


                          (17) 
That definition is valid only if at most one of the wi's is equal to zero. To show this, consider 
an arbitrary player, say player 1. When all weights are positive, (17) can be decomposed as 
follows:  
 
1
1 {1}
( )\{1}
( , , ) ( , ) ( , )
( )
i
T
T N
w
SV N v w N v N v
w T
 

    
Letting 1 0,w   we obtain a well-defined limit:  
 
1
1
1 {1} 0
( )\{1}
( , , ) ( , ) lim ( , )
( )
i
w T
T N
w
SV N v w N v N v
w T
 

    
When two or more weights are set to zero, there is indeterminacy: several values are 
associated to the same weight system. Applying (17) to the unanimity game ( , ),NN u  we get: 
 ( , , ) ( 1,..., )
( )
i
i N
w
SV N u w i n
w N
   (18) 
an expression that reduces to 1/n in the symmetric case where weights are equal.  
The weighted Shapley value can alternatively be obtained as the random order value 
( , , )wRV N v p  associated to a probability distribution wp  on players' orderings that depends 
on w. For an arbitrary ordering , the marginal contributions of player i in the unanimity game 
( , )NN u  is defined by: 
 
( , ) 1 if (and only if ) comes in
0 otherwise
i NN u i last
 

 
Hence, (18) corresponds to the random order values associated to distributions such that 
/ ( )iw w N  is the probability that player i comes last in an arbitrary ordering, i.e. ( )Np   
should satisfy  
 
\
( , , ) ( , ) for all
( )i
N i
i i
i N
w
RV N u p p i i N
w N




     
Let's assume that weights are positive and natural numbers, iw  being interpreted as the 
number of players of type i. We then compute the probability that a given ordering comes out 
through a sequence of ( )w N  independent drawings, knowing that each time a player is 
drawn, he is removed and only the last player of a given type to be removed is placed in the 
 16 
ordering. To illustrate the process, let's take n = 3 and w = (1,2,3). There are 60 drawing 
sequences and for instance the sequence (3,2,3,3,1,2) leads to the ordering (3,1,2). In general, 
the number of possible sequences is given by ( )! !iw N w  and they all have the same 
probability of occurrence. Player j comes out last in a given ordering if and only if he is the 
last to be drawn. This happens with probability  
  
  !( ) 1 !
( 1)! ! ( )! ( )
i j
j i
i j
w ww N
w w w N w N






 
The probability that player k comes next to last knowing that player j came last is given by:  
 
 
,
!
( \ ) 1 !
( 1)! ! ( \ )! ( \ )
i
i j k
k i
i j k
w
w N j w
w w w N j w N j







 
Using this argument repeatedly until the second position, the probability that the ordering 
1( ,..., )ni i   comes out is given by: 
 12
1 2 1 1 1
2
1
( ) ...
... ...
n n k
n n j
n
i i ii
w k
ki i i i i i ij
w w ww
p
w w w w w w w
 



 
    


 
or 
 
1
2
1
1
( )
1 ( / )
j k
n
w k
k i ij
p
w w








 (19) 
This formula is then extended to the case where weights are real.
12
 
The probability distributions wp  are homogeneous of degree zero. Weights may therefore be 
normalized and there is a one-to-one relationship between the set of positively weighted 
values and the (relative) interior of ,n  the unit simplex of :
n  any positively weighted 
value is associated to a unique normalized weight system, and vice-versa.  
If a player is assigned a zero weight, weighted values are obtained as limit of sequences of 
positively weighted values. If there is a single zero-weight player, say player i, the limit 
distribution is still uniquely defined: player i is first with probability 1 and receives his 
individual worth ( ).v i  When two players or more are assigned a zero weight, several values 
are associated to the same normalized weight system. Considering converging sequences of 
positive weights, the resulting value depends on the relative speeds of convergence.   
                                                 
12
 I am grateful to Gerard van der Laan for suggesting this procedure. I initially used the sequence of n drawings 
where, each time a player is drawn, all players of the same type are removed. It leads to a probability distribution 
where wi/wj is the probability that player i comes first. This is appropriate for cost games and duals of surplus 
sharing games (see Dehez, 2011). The distribution (19) is obtained by considering the reverse order.   
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Let us denote the set of zero-weight players by { | 0}.w iZ i N w  
13
 For a given set N of 
players and non-negative weights w, the set of all weighted values is obtained from the 
probability distributions in the set 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) lim ( ) for some converging sequence ( ) 0kk kN N ww wF w p p p w       
In view of (19), this is a well-defined set: for any positive sequence ( )kw  converging to 
0,w  the associated sequence of distributions kwp  converges to a distribution ( ).w Np    
In particular, for 0,w   any probability distribution on N  is possible: (0) ( ).N NF      
We then define the Shapley set as the set of all weighted values:  
  ( , ) ( , , ) for some ( ) andn nNWS N v x x RV N v p p F w w        (20) 
Given a game ( , ),N v  consider its restriction ( , )ZZ v  on Z and the game ( \ , )N Z v  defined by 
( ) ( ) ( ).v S v Z S v Z    It is the game that concerns the subset of non-zero weight players, 
once ( )v Z  has been distributed to the zero-weight players. The following proposition 
establishes that, in order to compute weighted values, nonzero-weight players and zero-weight 
players can be treated separately.  
Proposition 1  The values of the weighted game ( , , )N v w  consists of the allocations 
\( , )Z N Zx x x  where ( , )Z Zx W Z v  and \ \( \ , , ).N Z N Zx SV N Z v w   
Proof  Inspecting (19), we observe that the distributions in ( )NF w  assign a zero probability to 
orderings in which a nonzero-weight player is followed by a zero-weight player. Hence, only 
orderings of the form \( , ) ( )Z N Z        do actually matter and the distributions 
( )w Np F w  are of the form 
 
\0 \
( ) ( ) ( ) for all ( , )
0 otherwise
N Zw w N N Z
p p p           

 
for some probability distribution 0 Z( ).p    The corresponding allocation is given by:  
 
\
\
( , )
0
( , )
( ) ( ) ( , )
N Z
Z N Z
i w ix p p N v
 
 
    
   
    
Hence, for a player ,i Z  we have:  
 
\
\
0 0( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )N Z
Z N Z Z
i i Z w i Zx p Z v p p Z v
 
  
     
    
       
i.e. Zx  is a random order value of the game ( , ).ZZ v  Hence, ( , ).Z Zx W Z v  
                                                 
13
 In what follows, we omit the dependance of Z on w. 
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Consider now the characteristic function v  defined on \N Z  by ( ) ( ) ( ).v S v Z S v Z    For 
an ordering 
\( , ) ( )Z N Z       and a player \ ,i N Z  we have:  
 
\ \
\ \
\ 0( ) ( \ , ) ( ) ( ) ( \ , )N Z N Z
N Z Z N Z
i w i N Z w ix p N Z v p p N Z v
 
  
     
    
       
i.e. 
\N Zx  is the value associated to the weighted game \( \ , , ).N ZN Z v w     
Remark 6 In practice, when more than one player are assigned a zero weight, it seems natural 
to treat them equally by considering converging sequences such that the ratios of their weights 
are equal to 1. The corresponding distribution is then given by 0( ) 1/ ! for all Zp z    and 
the resulting allocation is the symmetric Shapley value of the game ( , ).ZZ v
14
  
The Shapley set is clearly a non-empty subset of the Weber set and, as a solution, it is 
covariant. It is however not a convex set in general, as this was observed by Monderer, Samet 
and Shapley (1992), except for the 2-player case or when applied to convex games, as we 
shall see later.  
Remark 7 Owen (1968) has been the first to notice that weighted values are not necessarily 
monotonic with respect to weights: an increase in the weight assigned to a player may indeed 
result in a decrease of his payoff. Weights being interpreted as measures of players' relative 
importance (Shapley talks about bargaining ability), this is an embarrassing fact. It is however 
no surprise in view of (17), knowing that dividends may be negative.
15
 Monotonicity clearly 
holds for almost positive games. Monderer et al. (1992) have shown that it actually holds for 
(and only for) convex games. This can be explained intuitively by the link that exists between 
a characteristic of convex games and the probability distribution over orderings induced by 
the weights. Increasing the weight of a player means increasing his probability of arriving late 
and we know that marginal contributions are increasing with coalition size in convex games. 
Hence, increasing the weight of a player naturally increases his expected payoff.  
3.7. Relation between solutions 
We first notice that, except for the imputation set, the Weber set is the only solution that 
satisfies the five basic requirements under superadditivity. The question is to see how the 
core, the Weber set, the Shapley set and the Harsanyi set are interrelated? The following 
proposition is due to Derks et al. (2000).  
Proposition 2  Marginal contribution vectors are Harsanyi payoff vectors. 
                                                 
14
 See Dehez and Tellone (2013) for an application of the weighted Shapley value with zero weight players.   
15
 Owen (1968) suggests interpreting weights as reflecting slowness to reach a decision. An alternative definition 
of weighted value has been proposed by Haeringer (2006) in which an increase in the weight of a player leads to 
an increase in his share in positive dividends and a decrease of his share in negative dividends.  
 19 
Proof  Consider a game ( , ),N v  an arbitrary ordering N   and the distribution matrix   
defined by 
 
1 if and
0 otherwise
T i
i i T T   

  
where i  is the set of players preceding i in   and including i. Then, for any given coalition 
T, it gives a positive share only to the player in T  that has the highest rank in .  As a 
consequence, 1Tii T    for all T N  and .n  The corresponding H-payoff vector is 
then given by: 
 
( ) ( ) \
( , , ) ( ) ( \ )
i i i
i
T i i
i i T T T T
T N T T T i
h N v v v i
  
       
   
           
Hence, ( , , )h N v   is the marginal contribution vector associated to the ordering .      
As a consequence of Proposition 2, under superadditivity, the Harsanyi imputation set defined 
by 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )HI N v H N v I N v   
is a well-defined solution that obviously satisfies the five basic requirements.
16
  
Proposition 3 The following sequence of inclusions holds for all superadditive games: 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )C N v WS N v W N v HI N v H N v     
 Furthermore, when applied to convex games, the first three solutions 
coincide.  
Proof  Weber (1988) has shown that the core is a subset of the Weber set and that, when 
applied to convex games, the two solutions coincide. Actually this coincidence is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for convexity. We have already seen that weighted values are random 
order values.
17
 Monderer Samet and Shapley (1992) have shown that the core is a subset of 
the set of weighted values. By Proposition 1, random order values are convex combinations of 
Harsanyi imputation vectors. The sequence of inclusions then follows from convexity of the 
Harsanyi set.   
Proposition 4 All solutions coincide on the set of almost positive games:  
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )C N v WS N v W N v HI N v H N v     
This is a corollary of the following proposition due to Hammer et al. (1977) and Vasil'ev 
(1978).   
                                                 
16
 Notice that for 2-player games, the Harsanyi set coincides with the imputation set.  
17
 In fact, the Shapley set is in general a dimensionally small subset of the Weber set. 
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Proposition 5  The core and the Harsanyi set coincide on the set of almost positive games.  
Proof Let ( , )N v  be an almost positive (and thereby convex) game. Looking at its 0-
normalization, we have:  
 
0 0
( )
( ) ( , ) ( )T T
T N
v S N v u S

   
where the 
T  are all non-negative. For any given ,T N  the core of the game ( , )T TN u  is 
given by:  
  ( , ) ( ) and 0 for allnT T T iC N u x x T x i T       
Indeed ( ) 0Tu i   for all { },T i  { }( ) 1iu i   and { }( ) 1 for all .iu j j i   The core is additive on 
the class of convex games. This follows from the following two lemmas:
 
 
Lemma 3  The core is a superadditive solution (Peleg, 1986). 
Lemma 4  The Weber set is a subadditive solution (Dragan, Potters and Tijs, 1989). 
Hence, we have:  
 0
( ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) { | ( ) and ( \ ) 0}nT T T
T N T N
C N v C N u x x T x N T 
 
       
where the right hand side is the Harsanyi set of the game 0( , ).N v       
Actually, Hammer et al. (1977) prove that the core and the Harsanyi set coincide if and only if 
they apply to almost positive games. Knowing that core allocations (if any) are H-payoff 
vectors, another way to prove Proposition 5 consists in showing that the reverse inclusion 
( , ) ( , )H N v C N v  holds for almost positive games. Indeed, using (14), we have:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( , , )
( ) ( )
T T T
i i T i T i T
i S i S T N i S T S i S T N
T S
T T T
T i i T i T
T S i T i S T N i S T N
T S T S
h N v
v S v S
      
     
      

     
 
  
    
      
     
 
At this stage, we can conclude that the core, the Shapley set, the Weber set and the Harsanyi 
imputation set all satisfy the five basic requirements when applied to convex games. In 
particular, the Shapley set is convex in this case.  
Remark 8 Concerning the Shapley set, assuming convexity, there is a homeomorphism 
between the relative interior of the unit simplex and the relative interior of the core. This 
homeomorphism cannot be extended to non-negative weights and boundary core allocations, 
except when the game is strictly convex.  
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3.8  An illustration: liability games 
Liability games have been introduced by Dehez and Ferey (2013). They cover situations 
where damage has been caused to a victim by several tortfeasors ("players") following the 
natural order 1,2,…,n. Each player is responsible for an additional damage, 
id  for player i. 
The associated game ( , )N v  is then given by:  
 
1
1 2
( ) 0 if 1
( ) if 1 and 2
( ) if 1,2 and 3
v S S
v S d S S
v S d d S S
 
  
   
 
and so on… Defining {1,..., }iT i  as the set of subsequent players, starting with 1 and ending 
with i, the characteristic function can be written as:  
 ( ) ( )
ii T
i N
v S d u S

   
The problem is to divide the total damage 1( ) ... nv N d d    among the n players. The 
resulting allocation specifies the compensation that each player must pay to the victim.  The 
Harsanyi dividends of a liability game are given by: 
 
( , ) if
0 otherwise
T i iN v d T T  

 (21) 
Hence, liability games are positive and thereby convex and all solutions coincide with the 
core.
18
 In the 3-player case, the vector of dividends is given by 1 2 3( , ) ( ,0,0, ,0,0, ).N v d d d    
Using (8), it can be verified that the core of a liability game can be written as:    
 ( , ) ( ) ( ) and for all
n n
n
j j
j i j i
C N v x x N d N x d i N
 
  
     
  
   
By convexity, it is the convex polytope whose 12n  vertices are the marginal contribution 
vectors as defined by (5). In the 3-player case, there are four distinct marginal contribution 
vectors:  
 
(1,2,3)
1 2 3
(1,3,2) (3,1,2)
1 2 3
(2,1,3)
1 2 3
(2,3,1) (3,2,1)
1 2 3
( , , )
( , ,0)
( ,0, )
( ,0,0)
d d d
d d d
d d d
d d d

 

 

  
 
   
 
                                                 
18
 Liability games are dual of airport games, known to be positive games.  
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We observe that the allocation that imposes to the first player to pay the entire damage as well 
as the allocation x d  that imposes to players to pay exactly their additional damages are 
core allocations. The core is illustrated in Figure 1.  
In the context of Tort Law, weights can be used to reflect the degree of misconduct or 
negligence. Using (17) and (21), the weighted Shapley value associated to given positive 
weights 
1( ,..., )nw w  defines the following apportionment rule: 
 ( , , )
( )
n
i
i j
j i j
w
SV N v w d
w T
   (22) 
In the 3-player case, we obtain the following allocation:  
 
1 1
1 3 2 1
1 2 3 1 2
2 2
2 3 2
1 2 3 1 2
3
3 3
1 2 3
w w
x d d d
w w w w w
w w
x d d
w w w w w
w
x d
w w w
  
  
 
  

 
 
This triangular formula shows the one-to-one relationship that exists under convexity between 
the relative interior of the core and the relative interior of the unit simplex: to each core 
allocation, there exists one and only one weight vector in int nw   and vice versa. For 
boundary core allocations, limits have to be considered. For instance, the allocation x d  
corresponds to sequences ( ) intk nw    where 1 2and
k kw w  converge to zero and the ratio 
1 2/
k kw w  converges to zero as well. Many boundary core allocations imply the exemption of 
some players. For instance, the allocation 1 2 3( ,0,0)d d d   that exempts players 2 and 3 is 
associated to the weight vector (1,0,0). 
Using (22), the symmetric Shapley value is given by:  
 
1
( , )
n
i j
j i
SV N v d
j
  
In the 3-player case, we get the following allocation:  
 
1 3 2 1
2 3 2
3 3
1 1
3 2
1 1
3 2
1
3
x d d d
x d d
x d
  
 

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Figure 1: The core of a 3-player sequential liability game 
 
 
(d1+d2+d3, 0, 0) 
(0, d1+d2+d3, 0) (0, 0, d1+d2+d3) 
1 1x d   
3 3x d   
 
SV 
1 2 3( , , )d d d  1 2 3( , , 0)d d d  
1 2 3( , 0, )d d d  
1 2 3 2 3( /2 /2, /2 /2, 0)d d d d d    
2 1 1x x d    
3 3 / 3x d   
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Harsanyi payoff vectors have the same structure. They are given by 
 ( , , ) j
n
T
i i j
j i
h N v d 

  (23) 
where only the j
T
i  matter. In the 3-player case, they are given by:  
 
123 12
1 1 3 1 2 1
123 12 123 12
2 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 2
123 123 123
3 3 3 1 2 3
(1 )
(1 )
x d d d
x d d d d
x d d
 
   
  
  
    
   
 
It is important to notice that, as a rule, the H-payoff vector and the weighted Shapley value are 
such that no one is liable for damage caused downstream in the liability sequence: what  
player i contributes depends only on ( ,..., ).i nd d  This is a characteristic of the core. The two 
solutions however differ in the number of coefficients they require: weighted values require 
the specification of n – 1 coefficients while Harsanyi payoff vectors require the specification 
of ( 1) / 2n n  coefficients. Hence, the later offer more degree of freedom and it may be more 
appropriate to use dividend allocations instead of weights to characterize judgments: a 
judgment would then require specifying how each additional damage 
id  (i = 1,…,n ) is to be 
allocated between the players 1 to i. However, for more than three players, there is no one-to-
one correspondence between core allocations and dividend distributions.  
4. Characterizing solutions 
There are different ways to characterize solutions. Here we will consider two ways: by axioms 
and by restrictions on dividend distributions.  
4.1 Characterizing solutions by axioms  
Consider the following four properties:   
Null player:  null in ( , ) 0 for all ( , )ii N v x x N v     
Additivity: 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )N v v N v N v     
Weak positivity: ( ) ( , ) nv G N N v       
Strong positivity:  ( ) ( , ) nv MG N N v      
These are usual properties.
19
 The following proposition due to Vasil'ev (1975, 2006) provides 
an axiomatization of the Harsanyi set.
20
 We give here a simple proof.   
Proposition 6 The Harsanyi set is the unique solution : ( ) nG N   satisfying efficiency, 
null player, additivity and weak positivity.  
                                                 
19
 The term monotonicity is sometime used instead of positivity.  
20
 Vasil'ev also requires homogeneity although only additivity is actually needed.  
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Proof  It is easily verified that, for all games, the Harsanyi set defines an application that 
satisfies efficiency, null player, additivity and weak positivity. We have to verify unicity. 
Applied to the unanimity game ( , )TN u  where T N  and 0,   an application   
satisfying efficiency, positivity and null player gives:  
 ( , ) { | ( ) and 0 for all }nT iN u x x N x i T        
Indeed, the game ( , )TN u  is positive for 0   and players outside T are null players. 
Consider a game ( , )N v  and its decomposition (7) as .v v v     Additivity implies:  
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )N v N v v N v        
i.e. ( , ) ( , ) ( , )N v N v N v     where ( , )N v  and ( , )N v  are positive games. Hence, 
there is a unique application   satisfying efficiency, weak positivity, null player and 
additivity. it is given by: 
 
 
 
: 0 : 0
: 0
: 0
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
{ | ( ) and ( \ ) 0}
{ | ( ) and ( \ ) 0}
T T
T
T
T T T T
T T
n
T
T
n
T
T
N v N u N u
x x T x N T
x x T x N T
 


 


 




     
   
    
 


  
This is precisely the Harsanyi set of the game ( , ),N v  as given by (15).   
Replacing weak positivity by strong positivity, results in the Weber set: the Weber set is the 
subset of H-payoff vectors that satisfy the strong positivity axiom.   
To obtain the Shapley set, it is necessary to introduce an axiom that applies to values. Derks et 
al. (2000) use the following axiom:  
Consistency: ( , ( , )( ) ) ( , )i T S i Ti S T N N u S u N u       
It is weaker version of the partnership axiom introduced by Kalai and Samet (1987) to 
axiomatize the Shapley set. It is satisfied by the weighted value associated to positive weights. 
Indeed, we have:  
 ( , , )
( )
i
T
w
i T SV N u w
w T
    
and  
 
( )
( , ( , )( ) , )
( ) ( ) ( )
i i
T T
w ww S
i S T SV N N u S u w
w S w T w T
      
The Shapley set is the subset of H-payoff vectors that satisfy the consistency axiom.  
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Remark 9 Combining Proposition 5 and the argument used in the proof of Proposition 6, we 
have the following identities:
21
 
 ( , ) ( , ) and ( , ) ( , )C N v H N v C N v H N v       
and 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )H N v C N v C N v    
4.2 Characterizing solutions by restrictions on dividend distributions 
Harsanyi payoff vectors are defined by distribution matrices in 
n  without any further 
restrictions. A natural question concerns the identification of restrictions on distribution 
matrices such that the resulting set of H-payoff vectors corresponds to  particular solutions.  
Derks et al (2000) suggest to link distributions within a coalition to distributions within its 
sub-coalitions by requiring that a player's share in the dividend of a coalition cannot increase 
if the coalition gets larger:   
 S Ti ii S T        (24) 
If a player leaves a coalition, that should not reduce the share of those remaining in the 
coalition. This monotonicity property imposes strong restrictions on distribution matrices. In 
particular, if the share of a player in a coalition is zero, his share must be equally zero for all 
larger coalitions. We denote by ( , )mH N v  the subset of Harsanyi payoffs vectors derived 
from distribution matrices satisfying (24). Derks et al. (2000) have shown that the distribution 
matrices associated to random order values are monotonic, i.e. ( , ) ( , ).mW N v H N v  There 
may however be H-payoff vectors derived from monotonic distribution matrices that are not 
random order value.  
A stronger monotonicity requirement is needed. Vasil'ev (1988) and Derks et al. (2006) have 
proved the following proposition.  
Proposition 7 The H-payoff vectors derived from distribution matrices  satisfying the 
following inequalities  
 
:
( 1) 0 for all ands t Si
S S T
T N i T

       (25) 
 are random order values.  
More precisely, if ( )Siq  and ( )
S
i  satisfy  
 
:
( 1) and 0 for all andS s t S Si i i
S S T
q q T N i T

      
                                                 
21
 See Lemma 3 in Derks, Haller and Peeters (2000).  
 27 
the corresponding H-payoff vector and quasi-value coincide:  
  ( , , ) ( ) ( \ ) ( 1,..., )Si i
S N
h N v q v S v S i i n

     
Hence, ( , ) ( , )smH N v W N v  where ( , )smH N v  denotes the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors 
derived from distribution matrices satisfying (25). 
An even stronger restriction consists in assuming that the vector N  defines the "master" 
probability distribution from which all other distribution vectors T  for , 2,T N t   are 
derived by Bayesian updating: 
 whenever ( ) 0
( )
N
T Ni
i N
i T N T
T

 

      (26) 
Derks et al. (2000) have proved the following proposition. 
Proposition 8 The H-payoff vectors derived from distribution matrices  satisfying (26) are 
weighted Shapley values.  
Proof  When normalized weights and shares in T  are equal i.e. ,
Nw   we have:  
  
( ) ( )
( , , ) ( , , )
( ) ( )
i i
N
T i i
i i T T T iN
T N T N T N
w
h N v SV N v w
T w T

    
  
             
Hence, ( , ) ( , )bH N v SV N v  where ( , )bH N v  denotes the set of H-payoff vectors derived 
from distribution matrices satisfying (26). It is easily verified that under (26), the distribution 
matrices satisfy the monotonicity requirements (24) and (25).   
4.3  Implications of monotonic dividend distributions  
Can we identify ( , ),mH N v  the set of H-payoff vectors derived from distribution matrices 
satisfying the monotonicity conditions (24) ? We already know that ( , ) ( , ).mW N v H N v  
Furthermore, ( , ) ( , )C N v H N v  if (and only if) ( , )N v  is almost positive, in which case 
monotonicity has no impact and core allocations can be written as H-payoff vectors derived 
from monotonic dividend distributions: ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).mC N v H N v H N v    
This is illustrated by liability games: core allocations correspond to H-payoffs vectors defined 
by monotonic dividend distributions and, vice versa, monotonic dividend distributions define 
core allocations. To see this, consider the 3-player case. The core is the convex hull its four 
vertices, 1 2 3( ,0,0)d d d  , 1 2 3( ,0, ),d d d  1 2 3( , , )d d d  and 1 2 3( , ,0)d d d  i.e. core allocations 
are of the form  
  1 1 2 2 1 3 3 4 2 4 3 2 3 3( ) , ( ) , ( )x d d d d d d               for some 4    
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The corresponding dividend distributions are given by: 
 
12
1 2 3 4
123
1 4 2 3
( , )
( , , )
    
    
  
 
  
They clearly satisfy the monotonicity condition (24).  
Billot and Thisse (2005) claim that ( , )mH N v  coincides with the core if (and only if) the game 
is convex. This is actually only true for 3-player games! Consider a 3-player game and let x be 
the H-payoff vector corresponding to some monotonic dividend distribution. Individual 
rationality results from superadditivity:   
 
12 13
1 1 1
123
1
123
1
(1) ( (12) (1) (2)) ( (13) (1) (3))
( (123) (12) (13) (23) (1) (2) (3))
( (123) (23) (1)) 0
x v v v v v v v
v v v v v v v
v v v
 


      
      
   
 (27) 
Considering 2-player coalitions, superadditivity implies the following inequality:  
 
13 23
1 2 1 2
123 123
1 2
123
1
123
2
( ) (12) ( (13) (1) (3)) ( (23) (2) (3))
( )( (123) (12) (13) (23) (1) (2) (3))
( (123) (12) (23) (2))
( (123) (12) (13) (1))
x x v v v v v v v
v v v v v v v
v v v v
v v v v
 
 


       
       
   
   
  
where the last part is non-negative under convexity. The argument applies identically to all 
single players and 2-player coalitions, confirming that x is a core allocation.  
For more than three players, convexity is not sufficient to ensure that H-payoff vectors are 
core allocations under monotonicity. Consider the 4-player convex game defined by 
( ) 1.v S s   Its dividends are given by: 
 
{ }
{ , }
{ , , }
{1,2,3,4}
0
1
1
1
i
i j
i j k






 

 
The H-payoffs associated to the monotonic matrix given by Table 1 are (0.4, 0.7, 0.8,1.1),  an 
allocation that does not belong to the core: the coalition {1,2,3} indeed obtains only 1.9.  
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For 3-player games, (27) tells us that superadditivity is enough to ensure that monotonic 
dividend distributions define imputations. For 4-player games, adding convexity ensures 
individual rationality. To simplify and without loss of generality, let's assume ( ) 0v i   for 
all i. Considering an arbitrary distribution matrix , the H-payoff of player 1 is given by:   
 
12 13 14
1 1 1 1
123
1
124
1
134
1
1234
1
(12) (13) (14)
( (123) (12) (13) (23))
( (124) (12) (14) (24))
( (134) (13) (14) (34))
( (1234) (123) (124) (134) (234)
(12) (13) (14) (23) (24
x v v v
v v v v
v v v v
v v v v
v v v v v
v v v v v
  




  
   
   
   
    
     ) (34))v
 
By Lemma 1, ( ) 0v S   for all S. Using convexity and applying (24), we obtain: 
 
123
1 1
124
1
134
2
1234
1
( (123) (13) (23))
( (124) (12) (24))
( (134) (14) (34))
( (1234) (123) (124) (134) (234)
(12) (13) (14) (23) (24) (34))
x v v v
v v v
v v v
v v v v v
v v v v v v




  
  
  
    
     
 
Applying again (24) and making the appropriate simplifications, we finally get:  
 12341 1 ( (1234) (234)) 0x v v    
Convexity is needed for the result to hold. Indeed, consider the following 4-player game and 
associated dividends.  
 
{ }
{ , }
{ , , }
{2,3,4}
{1,2,3,4}
( ) 0 0
( , ) 1 1
(1, , ) 1 1 3 2
(2,3,4) 2 2 3 1
(1,2,3,4) 2 2 5 6 3
i
i j
i j k
v i
v i j
v i j
v
v





 
 
     
    
    
 
This game is superadditive but not convex. The distribution matrix given by Table 2, while 
satisfying the conditions of monotonicity, leads to an allocation that violates individual 
rationality. Player 1 is indeed allocated a negative amount: 1 2.1 4.2 1.65 0.45 0.x        
Beyond four players, convexity does not ensure individual rationality under monotonicity.  
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Indeed, consider the following game: 
 
{ }
{ , }
{1, , }
{ , , }
{1, , , }
{2,3,4,5}
{1,2,3,4,5}
( ) 0 0
( , ) 1 1
(1, , ) 2 1
( , , ) 3 0
(1, , , ) 4 1
(2,3,4,5) 5 1
(1,2,3,4,5) 6 1
i
i j
i j
i j k
i j k
v i
v i j
v i j
v i j k
v i j k
v
v







 
 
  
  
 
  
  
     
Again here, player 1 is allocated a negative amount on the basis of the monotonic distribution 
matrix given by Table 3.
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 4.4 Graph structures and restrictions on dividend distributions  
Given a game, additional data can be used to place restrictions on dividend distribution. The 
structure of a game itself may also convey information on players leading to such restrictions. 
This is the case where players are ordered like for instance river games (Ambec and 
Sprumont, 2002) and liability games (Dehez and Ferey, 2014).  
This question has been studied by van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil'ev (2014) where the 
ordering of players is modeled by a directed graph. Given a finite set N, a directed graph 
D N N   is a set of pairs ( , )i j  such that ( , ) .i i D  The set of directed graphs is denoted by   
.  Nodes are players and ( , )i j D  means that i precedes j. For a given game, the payoff of 
a player then depends not only upon the characteristic function but also on his position on the 
graph.
23
  
More specifically, van den Brink et al. (2014) suggest that, for any given pair of players, the 
shares in the dividends of all coalitions containing them be larger or equal for the player that 
precedes the other:  
 , and ( , )
S S
i ji j S i j D        (28) 
Given a game ( , )N v  and a graph ,D  this condition leads to a subset of the Harsanyi set 
that we denote by ( , , ).HG N v D  The authors consider only positive games in which case 
( , , )HG N v D  is a subset of the core by Proposition 5, called the Harsanyi constrained core. 
They prove the following two propositions, the second one applying only to positive games.  
                                                 
22
 We only reproduce the shares of player 1. Shares can easily be allocated to the other players so as to satisfy 
monotonicity.  
23
 Another instance of graph-driven restrictions on dividend distributions is given by van den Brink, van der 
Laan and Pruzhansky (2011) who consider games with communication graphs à la Myerson (1977). The idea is 
to link the dividend distribution to the "power" of the players as measured for instance by the size of their 
neighborhood.  
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 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 1234 
1 0.5 0.4 0.3 0 0 0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 
2 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.3 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 
3 0 0.6 0 0.5 0 0.3 0.3 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 
4 0 0 0.7 0 0.7 0.7 0 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 12 13 14 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 1234 
1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 0 0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 0.55 
2 0.3 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 0.15 0.15 0 0.15 0.15 
3 0 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.3 0.15 0 0.15 0.15 0.15 
4 0 0 0.3 0 0.7 0.7 0 0.15 0.15 0.7 0.15 
 
Table 2 
 
 
 
12 13 14 15 123 124 125 134 135 145 1234 1235 1245 1345 12345 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 
0.9 0 0 0 0.45 0.45 0.45 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.25 
0 0.9 0 0 0.45 0 0 0.45 0.45 0 0.33 0.33 0 0.33 0.25 
0 0 0.9 0 0 0.45 0 0.45 0 0.45 0.33 0 0.33 0.33 0.25 
0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.45 0 0.45 0.45 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 
 
Table 3 
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Proposition 9 For any given game ( , )N v and graph ,D  the Shapley value ( , )SV N v  is 
an element of ( , , ).H N v D  Furthermore, the Shapley value is the unique 
element of ( , , )H N v D  if and only if D is the complete directed graph 
 ( , ) .D i j N N i j     
Proof  The Shapley value is defined by 1/Si s   for all andi S S N   and therefore (27) is 
verified for all graph D. If D D , S Si j   for all , andi j S S N   and 1/
S
i s   for all 
and .i S S N   Hence,  ( , , ) ( , ) .HG N v D SV N v  Next, consider a directed graph D  such 
that ( , )j k D  for some j and k, ,j k  and the unanimity game { , }( , ).j kN u  From Remark 1, 
the allocation nx  defined by 1 and 0 for allk ix x i k    belongs to { , }( , , ).j kHG N u D  
It differs from the Shapley value { , }( , )j kSV N u  which allocated 1/2 to j and k.   
Proposition 10 For any positive game ( , ) ( )N v G N  and graph ,D   
( , , ) ( , )H N v D C N v  if and only if .D   
Proof  When ,D   ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )H N v D H N v C N v   as a result of Proposition 5. When 
instead ,D   there exist j and k such that ( , )j k D  and the allocation x  previously 
defined does not belong to { , }( , , ).j kHG N u D  However, it belongs to { , }( , ).j kC N u    
van den Brink et al. (2014) also characterize axiomatically the Harsanyi constrained core on 
the class ( )G N  of positive games. A solution associates a subset ( , , )N v D  to a game 
( , ) ( )N v G N  and directed graph D. They show that the Harsanyi constrained core is 
maximal among the solutions satisfying efficiency, null player property, additivity, weak 
positivity and the additional property of structural monotonicity defined by: 
 For all game ( , ) ( )N v G N  and directed graph ,D  all allocation ( , , )x N v D  
are such that i jx x  if ( , )i j D  and i is necessary to j in ( , ).N v   
Liability games are positive and are associated to the directed graph  
  ( , ) 1,..., 1and 1D i j i n j i       
It reduces to  {1,2},{2,3}D   in the 3-player case. (28) implies that damage id  is distributed 
among the players in {1,..., }iT i  according to coefficients satisfying  
 1 for 1,..., 1
i iT T
j j j i      
In the 3-player case, it means 12 12 12 123 123 123 123 1231 2 1 1 2 3 1 21 and 1 .                These 
inequalities in turn imply 12 123 123 1231 1 2 31/ 2, 1/ 3, 1/ 2 and 1/ 3        as shown in 
Figure 2. The resulting Harsanyi constrained core is shown in Figure 3.   
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Figure 2: Admissible distributions of d3 
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Figure 3: The Harsanyi constrained core of a 3-player sequential liability game 
 
 
(d1+d2+d3, 0, 0) 
(0, d1+d2+d3, 0) (0, 0, d1+d2+d3) 
1 1x d   
3 3x d   
 
SV 
1 2 3 2 3( /2 /2, /2 /2, 0)d d d d d    
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5. Concluding remarks 
Other solution concepts could be considered, for instance the nucleolus introduced by 
Schmeidler (1969). When the core is nonempty, it is a core selection and we know that it is 
then a particular H-payoff vector. Can it be characterized in terms of dividend distributions? 
The answer is negative: liability games offer a counter-example. As shown in Dehez-Ferey 
(2013), the nucleolus of a 3-player liability game is given by   
 
3 3 32 2
1 3 2
2 3 2 3 2 3
1 3 2
( , ) , , if 2
2 4 2 4 2
, , if 2
3 3 3
d d dd d
N v d d d
d d d d d d
d d d

 
     
 
   
   
 
 
In the first case, it is average of core's vertices that is the H-payoff associated to 12
1 1/2   and 
123 123
1 2 1/4.    In the second case, it is the equal loss allocation to which it is not possible to 
associate an admissible distribution matrix. As an apportionment rule, the nucleolus violates 
the "downstream" condition: in the second case, what player 3 contributes depends upon 
damage caused by player 2. 
Among the questions that remain open, there is the identification of restrictions on dividend 
distributions such that the resulting H-payoff vectors are imputations. At this stage, we have 
only learned that monotonicity is not sufficient even if convexity is assumed.  
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Appendix 
Lemma 1 Consider a game ( , )N v  such that ( ) 0v i   for all .i N  Superadditivity then 
implies that the characteristic functions v is monotone and positively valued. 
Proof  Consider a coalition S N  and a player .i S  By superadditivity, we have:  
 ( ) ( ) ( )v S i v S v i    
Hence, if ( ) 0v i   for all ,i N  adding a player to a coalition does not decrease its worth. 
This extends to the addition of any number of players. Positivity of v follows using the above 
inequality, starting with { }, 1,..., .S j j n       
Lemma 2 If i is necessary for j in ( , ),N v  then ( , ) 0 for all \T N v T N i    such that .j T  
Proof  Consider a coalition \T N i  not containing  j. We already know that ( ) 0T v j    if 
{ }.T j  Assume now that 0 for allS S T    such that .j S  We proceed by induction 
using (2). Because i is necessary for j in ( , ),N v  we have:  
 
\
( ) ( ) ( ) ( \ ) 0T S S
S T S T j
v T v T v T v T j  
 
             
Lemma 3 The core is a superadditive solution (Peleg, 1986). 
Proof Given a player set N, consider two set functions 1 2, ( )v v G N  and an allocation 
1 2( , ) ( , ).x C N v C N v   Then using (?), there exist 
1
1( , )x C N v  and 
2
2( , )x C N v  such that 
1 2x x x   i.e. 1 21 2( ) ( ) and ( ) ( ) for all .x S v S x S v S S N    Hence, we have: 
 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) for allx S x S x S v v S S N       
i.e. 1 2( , ).x C N v v       
Lemma 4 The Weber set is a subadditive solution (Dragan, Potters and Tijs, 1989).  
Proof Given a player set N, consider two set functions 1 2, ( )v v G N  and the corresponding 
marginal contribution vectors 1 2and   as defined by (6). By definition of convex hull 
(Rockafellar, 1970), we have:  
 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
( , ) ( , ) { ( ) | } { ( ) | }
{ ( ) | } { ( ) | }
N N
N N
W N v W N v co co
co
     
     
    
   
 
The marginal contribution vectors associated to the game 1 2( , )N v v  are the sum of the 
marginal contribution vectors. Hence, 1 2 1 2( , ) { ( ) ( ) | }NW N v v co          where  
 
1 2 1 2{ ( ) ( ) | } { ( ) | } { ( ) | }N N N                 
Consequently, by the definition of the convex hull, we have:  
  1 2 1 2{ ( ) ( ) | } { ( ) | } { ( ) | }N N Nco co                      
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